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ON THE ROAD OF GOOD INTENTIONS: JUSTICE BRENNAN
AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES
MICHAEL ARIENS*
INTRODUCTION

When Dwight D. Eisenhower nominated William J. Brennan, Jr., on
September 30, 1956, to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States, Will Herberg's book Protestant-Catholic-Jew'had been in
print for a year. Herberg's book illustrated a search in religion for identification
2
in a secularized, middle-class America. The success of Protestant-Cathoic-Jew
reflected an increase in the United States in church membership, a belief in God,
prayer, heaven, and the Bible. Herberg's quest was a search for identity, a search
for a rooted self in a society which had publicly denigrated roots in favor of the
American "melting pot." This severing of roots was exacerbated by the massive
post-World War II changes in housing patterns, the economy, Communist
hysteria and efforts to create social and cultural conformity. Herberg's book,
"inside an America
says Martin Marty, was part of a reinvigoration of religion
3
whose way of life itself was often regarded as religious."
When Justice Brennan took the oath of office on October 16, 1956, the
Supreme Court had decided only a few cases involving the religion clauses of the
first amendment. The Court had incorporated both the free exercise "clause" and
the establishment clause into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,4 thus making those provisions applicable to state as well as congressional
action. A 1952 decision granted free exercise rights to a religious corporation, 5
but at the time of Justice Brennan's appointment 6to the Court, judicial
interpretation of the religion clauses had been sparing.

Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas.
BA, 1979, St. Norbert College; J.D. 1982, Marquette University, LLM. 1987, Harvard University.
1.

W. HERBERG, PROTESrANT-CATHOUiC-JzW (1955).

2.

It was revised and reprinted in 1960.

3.
M. MARTY, PILGRIMS IN THEIR OWN LAND: 500 YEARS OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 422
(1984). See also Niebuhr, America's Three Melting Pots, N.Y. Times Bk. Rev., Sept. 25, 1955, at 6

(review of W. HERBERG, PROTESrANT-CATHOLIC-JEW).
4.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause); Everson v. Board of

Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment clause).
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
5.
In Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), the Supreme Court defined religion as a "belief
6.
in the Creator," and in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), the Court held that a prosecution
for criminal fraud could not be based on the truth or falsity of the defendants' religious beliefs.

Finally, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court held unconstitutional an Oregon
statute that forbade parents from sending their children to private or parochial school. In Pierce,the
Court relied solely on the fourteenth amendment and the implicit liberty within that amendment of
parents to control the upbringing and education of their children. See infra Section 1.
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Justice Brennan was asked during his confirmation hearings whether being a
Roman Catholic would affect his decisions as a judge. In response, he answered
that his duty was to interpret the Constitution without regard to his own
religious feelings.7 Before Justice Brennan's confirmation as an Associate
Justice, the list of former Justices who were Roman Catholic was both sparse
and, for the most part, lackluster: Chief Justices Roger Brooke Taney and
Edward White, and Associate Justice Frank Murphy.8 In some sense, Justice
Brennan was breaking new ground as a Catholic and as an Irish-American,
especially since Justice Murphy's tenure on the Supreme Court ended with his
death at age forty-nine after nine years on the bench.
Justice Brennan has never written an article or published a speech about the
religion clauses or about the role, if any, of religion in American public life. I
suggest that Justice Brennan's decisions concerning the religion clauses were
partly a product of his upbringing as an Irish-American Catholic, and were
related to two powerful cultural beliefs extant during the mid-20th century: (1)
the belief in the melting pot, by which immigrants were attuned to the American
way of life; and (2) the "Americanization" of Roman Catholics, in which
Catholics and others worked to eliminate the separateness and difference of
immigrant Catholics and to incorporate Catholics into the largely Protestant
middle class. One resulting goal of these cultural beliefs was to avoid political
disputes among religious sects.
The predominant method of avoiding disputes among religious groups was to
remove religion from American public life and isolate religion in the "private"
sphere. The establishment clause was partially suited to achieving this goal. At
the same time, since religious conflict was possible, the diversity of religious
belief in mid-twentieth century America required the fostering of a related goal,
minimizing state-linked coercion of religious belief to preserve religious belief.
The free exercise clause was utilized to effectuate this goal. Justice Brennan
both agreed with these goals and played a major role in forming constitutional
doctrine which attempted to accomplish them.
During the 1960s, these noble purposes were furthered by the Court's (and
Justice Brennan's) decisions interpreting the establishment and free exercise
clauses. In the 1970s, the Court was concerned not with structuring an
interpretive method for determining cases brought under the religion clauses, but

7.
See Totenberg, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARv. L. REV. 33, 37
(1990). The fear by some Americans that a Roman Catholic's religious beliefs would require him to
act contrary to the interests and values of the United States was more explicitly confronted during
the 1960 presidential campaign of John F. Kennedy. See J.F. KENNEDY, REMARKS ON CHURCH AND
STATE INCHURCH AND STATE INAMERICAN HISTORY 190 (J. Wilson &D. Drakeman eds. 2d ed. 1987)
(a reprint of Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy's speech in Houston, Texas, to Protestant clerics
in September, 1960).
8.
In The Believer and the Powers That Are author (and Judge) John T. Noonan, Jr., notes
that the religious beliefs of Supreme Court Justices have always been regarded as a taboo subject.
J.T. NOONAN, THE BEUEVER AND THE PowERs THAT ARE 238-39 (1987). The Public Information
Office of the Supreme Court refuses to divulge the religious beliefs of the Justices, and their
publications listing all Supreme Court justices do not include any mention of religious affiliation.
Currently Justices Scalia and Kennedy are identified as Roman Catholic.
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with applying that interpretive method to particular situations. By the end of
the decade the accretion of religion clause cases led to confusion, not clarity.
The struggle in the 1980s was whether a competing paradigm based on a
different and more dependent reading of history would replace the interpretive
method championed by Justice Brennan and others. In my view, Justice Brennan
convinced a majority of the Court of the validity of the old paradigm until the
late 1980s, when his interpretive structure was at least partially succeeded by a
third paradigm, "endorsement," particularly suited to a revision of the free
exercise clause. Justice Brennan's goals were deemed conflicting, not complementary. Justice Brennan's choice was to foster the "privatization" goal. This
goal of "privatizing" religion, the focus of the establishment clause, undermined
the decisions concerning religious autonomy which is the focus of free exercise
jurisprudence.
Herberg's book underscores the dilemma facing the Supreme Court since it
began hearing, on a regular basis, cases claiming an impermissible governmental
establishment of religion or a governmental infringement on a person's free
exercise of religion. When a society believes its way of life is religious, is there
any room left in the society for religion? How does law "fit" religion into a
society that is both predominantly secular and widely and pluralistically
"religious"? How do those who are both religious and believers in the "American
way of life" reconcile those divergent beliefs and actions?
In the thirty-four years of Justice Brennan's tenure, the Court worked several
revolutions in religion clause jurisprudence-revolutions guided by a sense of the
needs of a changing society. Revolution, as demonstrated by the historian of
science I. Bernard Cohen, has at least two different historical meanings: to
revolve, as in a return to some older order of things, and to make new, as in
overturning.9 Justice Brennan's religion clause opinions were calculated to work
a revolution in the sense of a new order, but this revolution sowed the seeds of
a return to an older order. Justice Brennan was one of several architects of a
new order in establishment clause interpretation, and was the architect in
refraining the constitutional view of the free exercise clause. In particular, the
all-embracing interpretation of the establishment clause eventually was a catalyst
used by a revisionist Supreme Court in 1990 to complete a revolution in free
exercise jurisprudence. That revolution returned the legal interpretation of the
free exercise of religion to an older order of things. Additionally, the middle
level of generality used to evaluate establishment clause claims has neither
fostered the higher level goals of the Court nor created a specific understanding
for governmental officials to guide their conduct. In other words, the good
intentions by which the Supreme Court, including Justice Brennan, decided
religion clause cases for much of the period between 1956 and 1990 have led to
suspicion, misunderstanding, and confusion, not enlightenment, tolerance, and
respect.

9.

See I. COHEN, REvoLUTION IN SCIENCE 51-76 (1985).
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Rigidly separating establishment clause jurisprudence from free exercise
jurisprudence creates a false duality about the interrelationship of law, religion,
and government. However, in order to clearly present my argument, reference
often will be made only to one or the other provision. Section I of this essay is
a short, general history of the religion clauses in the Supreme Court. The next
three sections chronologically discuss the decisions of the Court from the distinct
periods 1956-1970, 1971-1980, and 1981-1990, followed by a conclusion. As in
so many areas of constitutional law, Justice Brennan has profoundly affected and
influenced academic and popular thinking about religion and law in America.
This Article is a preliminary effort to examine Justice Brennan's opinions in light
of the values he brought to the Court.

I. RELIGION IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court's decisions regarding religion before the Civil War were
few. The Court decided two cases assessing the lawfulness of grants of property:
the first invalidated a bequest to an unincorporated religious body,' and the
second upheld a will which bequeathed property to the City of Philadelphia for
constructing a college for poor white male orphans with the stipulation that no
cleric hold any position with the college." The Court additionally held that
property purchased for the use of the Church of England before the Revolutionary War devolved after the war to the Protestant Episcopal Church, not the
Commonwealth of Virginia.12 In 1845, the Court held that the religion clauses
were not applicable to the states.'
The opinion in Reynolds v. United Statesw the first attempt to define the
contours of the religion clauses. The unanimous Court turned to the historical
record to define "religion," and in particular, they turned to battle in Virginia in
1784 over state support of teachers of the Christian religion. The debates in
Congress over the phrasing and meaning of the religion clauses were conflated
with James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance against the proposed
Virginia legislation and Jefferson's 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist Association interpreting the religion clauses to "[build] a wall of separation between
church and State."5 Consequently, "Congress was deprived of all legislative
power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach 6 actions which were in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order."

10.

Trustees of Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Harts Exrs., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819).

11.

Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 117 (1844).

12.
13.

Terrett v. Taylor, 14 U.S. (9 Cranch) 23 (1815).
Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 671 (1845).

14.
15.
16.

98 U.S. 145 (1878).
l at 164.
Id The criminal conviction of Reynolds for bigamy was affirmed.
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In a second case involving Mormons in the Territory of Utah, the Court
defined religion as referring "to one's views of his relations to his Creator."17
With the exception of cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses, 18 the development
of this definition was largely the extent of the constitutional interpretation of the
religion clauses until the decision by the Court in Everson v. Board of Education.19
The Everson case followed Reynolds in equating the meaning of the religion
clauses with the writings of Jefferson and Madison. The standard in assessing
the constitutionality of state action was the "\wall of separation between the
Church and State.'"20 The extent of a breach was not considered-any breach
in the wall violated the Constitution. For the five member majority, however,
a city program which reimbursed students for their transportation costs to
private schools l did not breach the wail of separation since the program was
a safety measure properly permitted under the sovereign's police power.2
The dissent by Justice Rutledge in Everson was the first of three separate
opinions written which set forth at length a proposed interpretive method of the

17. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333,342 (1890). See also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (After concurring in the Court's judgment sustaining the
Illinois law denying Myra Bradwell's application to practice law, Justice Bradley added, 'This is the
law of the Creator."); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465 (1892) ("[N]o
purpose of action against religion can be imputed to any legislation, state or national, because this
is a religious people.").
18.
See Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (holding unconstitutional a city ordinance
levying a flat license tax on booksellers as applied to a Jehovah's Witness whose income was derived
by selling religious tracts and whose activities were deemed religious); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding unconstitutional on free speech grounds a
requirement that all public schoolchildren salute the American flag); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a tax on distribution of literature because the action of the distributors
was religiously based); Princev. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding child labor law against
religious liberty attack); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating the free exercise
clause into the fourteenth amendment and holding unconstitutional a statute forbidding solicitation
for religious purposes unless the Secretary of State had previously determined the solicitation was
religiously-based and approved it).
19. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Several other cases tangentially touch upon the religion clauses.
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871) (deciding, apparently based on federal common law,
that Kentucky courts were without jurisdiction to decide a dispute about the ownership of church
property because the nature of the dispute was ecclesiastical); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291
(1899) (holding a federal grant to a hospital incorporated by the District of Columbia and run by the
Catholic Sisters of Charity did not make the corporation a religious corporation, making the
establishment clause inapplicable); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (holding that funds held
in trust for Sioux Indians were the property of the Sioux, and thus Congress could not prohibit the
Sioux from spending that money for religious education); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (holding that an Oregon law requiring all schoolchildren to attend public schools violated a
parent's liberty to control the education and upbringing of their children under the fourteenth
amendment); Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (holding that a state
program providing secular textbooks to children in parochial and private schools did not deprive a
taxpayer of property without due process of law).
20. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds, 330 U.S. at 164).
21.
The ordinance limited the reimbursement to public or Catholic schoolchildren. Everson,
330 U.S. at 4 n.2. Since there was no allegation that this program discriminated against any other
schoolchildren, the majority refused to consider whether this limitation was unconstitutional.
22. Id at 17-18.

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

religion clauses. Justice Rutledge's history of the religion clauses thoroughly
canvassed the Virginia experience in creating religious liberty, and concluded
that the sparseness of the congressional record regarding the meaning of the
religion clauses was due to the fact that "the matter had become so well
2
understood as to have been taken for granted in all but formal phrasing." 3
Using Madison's argument in the Memorial and Remonstrance that even a
"three pence" tax was too high,7A Justice Rutledge concluded that any "entangling" aid violated the high wall of separation required by the Constitution.
An interesting aspect of the Rutledge dissent is the manner in which the
arguments move. In concluding that the reimbursement of transportation costs
is as "essential" to education and as "direct" an aid to religious education as
books, tuition, school buildings, salaries, equipment, or anything else, Rutledge
argued that "no rational line can be drawn"2 among these items, and that the
only difference is the amount of money involved. In other words, it is simply a
difference in degree, not a difference in kind. This difference is no difference at
all, according to Madison, so Justice Rutledge concluded that the line must be
drawn at prohibiting all aid. This argument was bolstered by a nascent "political
divisiveness"/slippery slope argument. Creating fissures in the wall of separation
would result in "the struggle of sect against sect"2 and "It]he end of such strife
cannot be other than to destroy the cherished liberty."2 Thus, the goal of the
establishment clause, like the free exercise clause, is religious liberty, and
prohibiting aid is necessary to foster religious liberty. Using this interpretation,
the establishment and free exercise clauses are complementary parts of a whole
designed to protect religious liberty. The establishment clause is a "negative"
liberty which must be paired with the "positive" liberty of the free exercise clause.
After the political divisiveness argument, Justice Rutledge addressed the
argument that prohibiting aid restricted the liberty of choice of the parents, thus
infringing upon their free exercise of religion. This was met with a formal
neutrality argument. The formal neutrality argument is that there is no "legal
discrimination" against the parents whose religious beliefs cause them to send
their children to religious schools, for they have at least presently "waived" their
right to send their children to free public schools. Even if the principle of
absolute separation results in a lack of choice or a hampering of religious
conscience, "it is only by observing the prohibition rigidly that the state can
maintain its neutrality and avoid partisanship in the dissensions inevitable when
sect opposes sect over demands for public moneys to further religious education.
"28

23.
Id
24. Id
ASSMssMEWIs
25. Id
26. Id
27.
Id
28. Id

at 42 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
at 40.41. J. MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RFIiGIOUs
1 3 (1785), reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1947).
at48.
at 53.
at 54.
at 59.
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The next year the Court used the "separationist" lens to hold unconstitutional
a "released time" program in the public schools.2 In McCollum v. Board of
Education, public schoolchildren were taught religion by their Protestant
minister, Catholic priest or Jewish rabbi during the school day in the public
school classroom. Four years later, the Court found constitutional a "released
time" program in which the public schoolchildren were taught religion off the
public school grounds. 0
Finally, in a courageous decision, the Court reversed a decision of the New
York Court of Appeals and in effect determined that the true owner of St.
Nicholas Cathedral in New York City was a Russian Orthodox religious
corporation with clear ties to the Soviet Union, not a distinct Russian Orthodox
religious corporation which had denounced Soviet Communism.31
II.

BUILDING A MODEL,

1956-1970

Justice Brennan was sworn in as an Associate Justice shortly after the
beginning of the October 1956 Term; the Court did not decide a religion clause
case until June 15, 1960. That case, Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,32 was
a per curiam decision upholding a previous decision made by the Court in
1952. 33 In the following three years, however, Justice Brennan would successively write dissenting, concurring, and majority opinions which altered as well
as strengthened "thewall of separation metaphor" accepted by all the Justices in
Everson.
In 1961, Justice Brennan authored a dissenting opinion in Braunfeld v.
Brown, 34 one of four cases3s decided the same day concerning the constitutionality of state Sunday closing laws. Justice Brennan joined the majority opinion
in the companion case of McGowan v. Maryland,36 which held that neither the
establishment clause nor the equal protection clause invalidated laws requiring
the closing of some commercial businesses on Sundays. 37 In Braunfeld, however,
the issue was whether the Pennsylvania Sunday closing law violated the free
exercise rights of Orthodox Jews whose religious beliefs compelled them to close

29.

Illinois er rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

30.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (The majority opinion by Justice Douglas
includes the famous statement, 'Ve are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being.).
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S.
31.
94 (1952).
32.
363 U.S. 190 (1960).
33. Kedroff, 344 U.S. 94.
366 U.S. 599 (1961). Brennan also dissented in Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market,
34.
Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961), based on his dissenting opinion in Braunfeld
35.

In addition to Braunfeld and Gallagher, the other cases decided were McGowan v.

Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), and Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S.
582 (1961).
36.
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
37.
See id
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on Saturdays. The majority opinion of Chief Justice Warren dismissed this
argument for the reason that the closing law advanced the state's secular goals
and imposed only an indirect burden on religious freedom.
In dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the choice was "whether a State may put
an individual to a choice between his business and his religion."3 Even though
the law neither required the Orthodox Jew to affirm repugnant beliefs nor to
work on the Sabbath, the law in effect forced an Orthodox Jew to choose either
his business or his religion.3 9 In other words, while the law was not enacted to
impair either the religious worship or commercial opportunities of Orthodox
Jews (or Sabbatarians), and was formally neutral, the result of the law in action
was to force Orthodox Jews to make this choice. Justice Brennan next
analogized the Sunday closing law to the ordinance taxing the sale of religious
literature declared unconstitutional in Follett v. McCormick.40 The Sunday
closing law had the same effect on Orthodox Jews as had the tax on Jehovah's
Witnesses; since the latter ordinance had been constitutionally invalidated, the
Sunday closing laws were similarly invalid.4'
The perspective suggested by Justice Brennan's dissent in Braunfeld was
elaborated upon in his concurring opinion in School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp.42 The Schempp case reiterated the holding the previous
year in Engel v. Vitale,43 that state-sponsored prayer in public schools violated
the establishment clause.M The majority opinion by Justice Clark in Schempp
was notable in several respects. First, it created distinctive interpretive methods
for the establishment and free exercise clauses; the former clause required no
coercive effect for the court to determine the constitutionality of the law,
contrary to a case argued under the free exercise clause.4 Second, the Court
stated that it was guided by a neutrality between church and state.4 Third, the
stated "test" for the constitutionality of legislation allegedly violating the
establishment clause was formalized as, "[W]hat are the purpose and the primary
effect of the enactment?" 47 This "test" formalized Justice Brennan's dissent in
Braunfeld, a dissent predicated on the free exercise clause.
Justice Brennan's concurrence is masterful, following a tradition of separate
opinions in religion clause cases begun by Justice Rutledge in Everson.48 Justice

38.

Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 611 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

39.

Id at 613.

40,
321 U.S. 573 (1944). Follett was limited to its facts in two cases: Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), and Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688
(1990). See infra text accompanying notes 158-79 (discussing Texas Monthly and Swaggart).
41. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 613.
42.
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
43.
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
44.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 220-22.
45. Id. at 223.
46. Id. at 225-26.
47. Id at 222. See also Braunfel4 366 U.S. at 607 (using language of purpose and effect).
48. For example, Justice Frankfurter wrote a 100 page concurrence in McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 459 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Brennan's concurring opinion attempted to accomplish four things: (1) reduce
or eliminate the reliance by the Court on the framer's intent in interpreting the
religion clauses; (2) revise 19th and early 20th century Supreme Court
"precedent" regarding the religion clauses; (3) establish a comprehensive claim
about the meaning and interpretation of the religion clauses; and (4) give
specific examples of constitutional and unconstitutional state aids to religion.
In each respect Justice Brennan was successful.
The concurring opinion begins by quoting Marshall's rhetoric in McCulloch v.
Maryland49 that "it is a constitution that we are expounding."s Even if Jefferson
or Madison had considered the question of prayer in public schools, their
answer(s) would not be dispositive since it was the Court's duty to translate the
general purpose of the religion clauses into concrete restraints on officials in the
twentieth century 5l Therefore, "[a] too literal quest for the advice of the
Founding Fathers upon the issues of these cases seems ... futile and misdirected"52 due to the ambiguity of history, the historic development of public
education, the increasing religious diversity of the United States, and the
function of the public schools in forming a melting pot. The assumption
underlying the final reason was that the public school was free from parochialism, divisiveness, or separatism, and that it allowed the assimilation of all to a
common American heritage.
Justice Brennan then reviewed the history of the Supreme Court and the
religion clauses to shed light on the principles involved in Schempp. This aspect
of the opinion is worth noting because it exemplifies two aspects of Justice
Brennan's immense influence as a justice: his facility with precedent, and his
ability to restructure the Court's dialogue. While accepting every prior decision
of the Court as binding precedent, Justice Brennan re-molded and re-shaped
these cases. One set of cases was read to invoke a principle of strict neutrality.
The precedential impact of another group of cases was minimized because they
really were not decided under the first amendment. A third group of cases
constructing the free exercise clause held that while conduct motivated by
religious belief could be regulated, government could not compel behavior
offensive to religious principles. 3
After defending the incorporation of the establishment clause into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, Justice Brennan concluded that the
establishment clause was intended to play the dual role of preventing religious
incursions into governmental policy and governmental interference with religion.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
49.
50. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 230 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original).
51. Id at 236-37.
52.
I4 at 237.
Id at 250. The apparent exception to tfiis rule, Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293
53.
U.S. 245 (1934), was demonstrated as effectively overruled, and if not overruled, inapplicable to the

Schempp case because college students voluntarily attended school, while elementary and high school
students were compelled to attend school. Id
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While the specific views of the Framers were not dispositive, the Court was
required to follow their general vision, one which forbade those "involvements"
of religious and secular institutions "which (a) serve the essentially religious
activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for
means to serve
essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious
S4
suffice."
would
means
secular
where
ends,
governmental
Then Justice Brennan evaluated the possibility of conflict between the
establishment and free exercise clauses. Using the specific examples of state-paid
military and prison chaplains, Justice Brennan apparently concluded that there
existed no establishment clause violation because neither the military personnel
nor the prisoners were coerced into attending religious services, and both groups
consisted of adults.ss However, this did not necessarily mean that the government was required under the free exercise clause to provide chaplains.
This reconciliation of the two clauses focused on the perspective of the
believer; the taxpayer who, for either religious or secular reasons, opposed
paying taxes for the support of military or prison chaplains was not envisioned
in this understanding. As long as the believer was the focus of the approach, the
conflict was minimized. However, once the taxpayer's interests were the focus
of the Court, the conflict returned.
In response to the argument that the holding in Schempp required the
invalidation of "every vestige, however slight, of cooperation or accommodation
between religion and government," s6 Justice Brennan demurred. He wrote, "I
venture to suggest that religious exercises in the public schools present a unique
problem."57 Justice Brennan then suggested a line of holdings for specific cases.
While couched in cautionary, tentative language, the effort appeared to attempt
a specific resolution of problems affecting the interpretation of both clauses.
Besides the military and prison chaplain example, Justice Brennan suggested the
constitutionality of the following: draft exemptions for ministers and conscientious objectors; the temporary use of empty secular buildings for religious
worship when the religious group was without a place of worship due to some
emergency; the recitation of prayers before legislatures; s8 the non-devotional
use of the Bible or discussion of religion in the public schools; tax exemptions
for charities, which included religious institutions; activities which no longer had
religious connotations; and the awarding of public welfare benefits to those
whose eligibility was based on religious considerations. 9
The constitutionality of the last suggestion was at issue in Sherbert v. Vemerne,
decided the same day as Schempp. Adell Sherbert was fired as a result of her

57.

I at 295.
IA at 298-99.
Id. at 294.
Id.

58.
59.
60.

Contra Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 296-304.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).

54.
55.
56.
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refusal to work on Saturdays, her Sabbath as a member of the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church. Because of her refusal to work on Saturdays, the state of
South Carolina determined she was ineligible for unemployment benefits because
she failed, without good cause, to accept suitable work.61
Interestingly, Justice Brennan's majority opinion first utilized the statement of
the majority in Braunfeld that "[ilf the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the
observance of one or all religions ... that law is constitutionally invalid even
though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect."62 Then, stating
the issue in the same manner as he did in Braunfeld, he wrote, "The ruling [of
South Carolina] forces her to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand."6 As he
had concluded in Braunfeld, this effectively burdened Adell Sherbert's free
exercise of religion. The state's interest in simplifying administration of its
unemployment compensation program, and its parallel interest in preventing
fraud, were insufficient to infringe Sherbert's free exercise rights.
The Sherbert case did not explicitly overrule Braunfeld because in the latter
case there was "a strong state interest in providing one uniform day of rest for
all workers."6 Finally, this case entailed no conflict between the two religion
clauses because it reflected government neutrality in the face of religious
6
differences, and not the involvement of religious with secular institutions.
The Schempp and Sherbert opinions represent the two goals of Justice
Brennan's religion clause jurisprudence: avoiding political divisiveness and
fostering religious autonomy. Religion and government needed to be separate
in particular public spheres, like the public schools, to protect the polity from
corrosion caused by religious differences in the United States. Religion might
interfere with a "fusing" of persons from different cultures, societies, and
backgrounds regarding American public virtues. For that reason the establishment clause was a "separation" clause.
On the other hand, since the United States comprises a multiplicity of
religious groups, and since realistically some state laws (like the South Carolina
unemployment compensation law, which permitted Sunday worshippers to obtain
benefits without making themselves available for Sunday work) already tilted in
favor of religious beliefs subscribed to by larger numbers of believers, the Court

61.
62.

IM.at 401.
Id at 404 (quoting Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607). What is interesting about this quote is the

absence of the next sentence in Braunfeld from Justice Brennan's opinion. It stated, 'But if the State

regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to
advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a
burden." Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607. The ability of Justice Brennan to "co-opt" precedent, as he did
in Sherbert,will, in my opinion, be one of the hallmarks of Justice Brennan's tenure on the Supreme
Court.
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was responsible for ensuring that the religious conduct of individuals was not to
be insensitively overborne by state action. These precepts guided the Court
through the end of the 1960s. What guided the Court in this interpretive
building phase were the beliefs that separation was possible, and that a "neutral,
position regarding the establishment clause and a "neutral"position regarding the
free exercise clause were consistent. It was not until 1969 that Justice Brennan
would again write an opinion regarding religion.6
Two local Georgia churches, members of a hierarchical general church
organization known as the Presbyterian Church in the United States ("PCUS"),
withdrew from the PCUS after a theological disagreement with the PCUS. 67
The local churches and the PCUS both claimed ownership of the property upon
which the local churches were built. The issue before the Supreme Court was
the constitutional role state courts could play in resolving the property dispute
between the local churches and the PCUS.
In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan held that there were "neutral
principles of law "68 which applied to all lawsuits without violating establishment
or free exercise principles. It was crucial for the courts to resolve these disputes
without becoming involved in "ecclesiastical questions." 69 Accordingly, the
Court found that the state court decision violated the first amendment because
it was based on whether the PCUS engaged in a "departure from [theological]
doctrine"70 and thus terminated the trust relationship between the PCUS and
the local churches. The case was remanded to the state court with instructions
not to base its decision on the departure from doctrine test.
The next year, in a concurring opinion in Maryland and Virginia Eldership of
the Churches of God v. The Church of God at Sharpsburg Inc.,71 Justice Brennan
clarified the constitutional requirements for resolving church property disputes.
The first option was for the civil court to identify whether the church was
congregational or hierarchical in form. If the former, the court should resolve
the dispute by adhering to the decision of the majority of the congregation. If
the latter, the court should follow the highest authority of the hierarchy. The
civil court would not review the correctness of the congregation's (or hierarchy's)
decision; it would merely identify which type of religious organization was before
the court.
66. From 1963 to 1969, the Court decided four cases involving religion. Justice Brennan
joined the majority in each of these cases: United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (defining
"religion" for purposes of determining whether Seeger met the statutory exemption for conscientious
objectors to the military draft); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (relaxing standing requirements
for persons who sue alleging violations of the establishment clause); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968) (holding constitutional a state statute requiring local school officials to lend secular
textbooks to all middle and high school students); and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)

(holding violative of the establishment clause Arkansas's statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution).
67.
Presbyterian Church in United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
68. IA at 449.
69. IaLat 451.

70.
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Second, the court could utilize "neutral principles of law" to resolve the case.
Neutral principles included reviewing "formal title" ownership of the property,
general principles of property law, deeds, reverter clauses, and general state
corporation laws.' In other words, when the issue was which of two competing
religious groups owned church property, "neutral principles" required the court
to undertake a secular review of documents explicitly based on religious ideas
and ideals.
Third, the state could pass special statutes governing church property
arrangements. In this case, the religious organizations would be fitted to the
statute, not the statute to the various religious organizations.
The other 1970 case which both completed the building by the Court of a
model of interpretation and began the renovation of that same system was Walz
v. Tax Commission.73 Walz concerned the constitutionality of a New York City
property tax exemption for charitable organizations, including religious
organizations. The majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger first opined that the
religion clauses were imprecisely written, and that previous Court statements
regarding the interpretation of the clauses were inconsistent because those
interpretations were too broadly stated.74 Burger restated the constitutional
goal of governmental neutrality toward religion, but then concluded that this
goal was a "benevolent" neutrality rather than a "strict" or "rigid" neutrality.75
Assessing whether a statute met the constitutional goal of neutrality required the
Court to determine not only whether the purpose of the legislation was secular
and its primary effect neither to sponsor nor to be hostile to religion, but also
whether "the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government entanglement
with religion."76 Since the uninterrupted history of the United States indicated
that religious organizations had enjoyed property tax exemptions, the statute did
not violate the establishment clause.
Although Justice Brennan had indicated in his concurring opinion in Schempp
that tax exemptions were not unconstitutional,77 his concurring opinion in Walz
attempted to temper Chief Justice Burger's altered interpretation of the
establishment clause. Relying on his concurring opinion in Schempp, Brennan
noted that while history itself was not determinative of the constitutionality of
a statute, it was an important aid in giving meaning to a constitutional
provision.78 The history of property tax exemptions for religious organizations
strongly indicated that these exemptions were not unconstitutional. Additionally,
and again following his concurrence in Schempp, Justice Brennan found two
secular reasons for holding the statute constitutional. First, they contributed to
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I at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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397 U.S. 664 (1970).

74.
75.
76.

Id at 668.
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the well-being of the community, even when the religious organizations used
Second, religious
religious property for exclusively religious purposes.
society by their
of
American
organizations "uniquely contribute to the pluralism
religious activities."79 Finally, Justice Brennan expanded on the meaning of
governmental "entanglement" with religion. There was a qualitative difference
between active subsidization of religion and passive exemption from taxation.
The former violated the establishment clause, while the latter did not.
By 1970, the Court, through Justice Brennan, had established a method of
interpreting the free exercise clause which evaluated the constitutionality of state
action in light of the actual impact on those making a claim for exemption. A
general law which indirectly burdened a person's religious actions was not, by
virtue of either its nonspecificity or deflected impact, necessarily constitutional.
Sherbert was the first case to hold a statute unconstitutional based solely on the
free exercise clause. The religion clauses also were interpreted, largely -through
Justice Brennan, to protect the autonomy of religious organizations in the
formation of church property arrangements. Lastly, the establishment clause
formed, in its three-part "test" of constitutionality, a Maginot Line protecting the
secular from the religious, and the religious from the secular. This test was a
middle level interpretive method operating to attain higher level goals of
religious autonomy and fostering some uniform American civic virtues.8° The
boundary separating religion and government promoted "neutrality" between
government and religion, a neutrality which the Court viewed as protecting
society from religiously-inspired political divisiveness and religion from the
profane secular world.
As the Court metamorphosed in the 1970s, other Justices began concretely
applying the establishment clause "test" in ways which diverged from the views
of Justice Brennan. The "test" of constitutionality remained the same, but its
application changed. Consequently, in the establishment clause cases decided
during the 1970s, Justice Brennan often dissented or joined dissents. What slight
alteration there was in the 1970s in free exercise jurisprudence seemed to expand
the reach of the clause. "Neutral principles of law" were both amended and
attacked at the end of the decade. In the 1970s, the Court decided approximately seventeen cases involving the religion clauses, and in the 1980s, the Court
decided over twenty-five cases. In 1990 alone, the Court decided four cases.

79. Id. at 689.
One example of this goal is Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (holding violative
80.
of the establishment clause Arkansas's statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution). Religious
opposition to evolution was deemed to impinge on the secular goal of educating scientifically literate
children. Justice Brennan joined the majority opinion in Eppenron, and later wrote the majority
opinion in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding unconstitutional a Louisiana statute
requiring a "balanced treatment" of evolution and creation science in public school on the grounds
that the legislation lacked a secular purpose).
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III. ADJUSTING, 1971-80
The predominant religion clause issue in the 1970s was the extent to which the
establishment clause barred governmental programs affecting private, sectarian
schools. The federal government and several state governments created a
number of different programs which the Court seemed to review annually.
Lemon v. Kurtzman8' expressly announced the addition of the "entanglement"
prong to the establishment clause, and held unconstitutional programs in
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island which, in the former case, permitted nonpublic
elementary and secondary schools to seek reimbursements for the secular portion
of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials, and which, in the
latter case, supplemented the salaries of parochial school teachers. While
"[c]andor compels acknowledgment... that we can only dimly perceive the lines
of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional [law,] "
the state programs created an unconstitutional entanglement of government and
religion. An additional form of entanglement was the possibility of political
divisiveness along religious lines.
This decision appeared consistent with Justice Brennan's vision of the religion
clauses. However, the Court held on the same day that a federal program
providing construction grants for buildings used for secular educational activities
at private, religiously-affiliated colleges did not violate the establishment
clause83 The entanglement of government and religion which resulted in
holding unconstitutional the programs evaluated in Lemon did not exist in
Tilton. "Since religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of
these church-related colleges and universities, there is less likelihood than in
primary and secondary schools that religion will permeate the area of secular
education."8
Based on his concurrences in Schempp and Walz, Justice Brennan concurred
in Lemon, concluding that the state programs were unconstitutional because they
were direct subsidies to religious institutions, and the subsidies used religious
means to serve secular ends where secular ends would suffice85 In so concluding, Justice Brennan distinguished the 1968 case of Board of Education v.
Allen,86 which held constitutional a state program loaning secular textbooks to
nonpublic schoolchildren. The rationale forAllen, according to Justice Brennan,
was that the aid was in theory to the parents and schoolchildren, not the
institution.8 Therefore, like the transportation reimbursement in Everson, the
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textbook loan program in Allen was "neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers."88
Dissenting in Tilton, Justice Brennan concluded that the federal program was
unconstitutional insofar as it disbursed funds to "sectarian" universities. The
reason was not that religion "permeated" secular education, but that the goals of
secular education and religious instruction were so intertwined that grants
supported both goals.89 The differences in governmental oversight, or governmental entanglement, in the two programs was ephemeral. Therefore, since "the
dangers of entanglement are [not] insubstantial," 90the federal program, like the
state programs, was unconstitutional as applied to grants to sectarian institutions.
The change in application presaged by the Tilton case continued throughout
the decade. The Supreme Court decided a trio of cases in 1973. A New York
program of tuition grants and deductions to parents earning less than $25,000
whose children attended nonpublic schools was held unconstitutional. 91 In
addition, the Court held constitutional a program allowing revenue bonds to be
issued to finance construction at religiously-affiliated colleges, 92 and unconstitutional a state program reimbursing nonpublic elementary and high schools for
costs associated with teacher-prepared examinations. 93 Two years later, in Meek
v. Pittenger,94 a program authorizing the state to lend textbooks to all schoolchildren, whether public or private school students, was held constitutional.
Meek also determined that lending instructional materials directly to nonpublic
schools was unconstitutional. 95
Next, Maryland's practice of providing noncategorical grants to private
colleges, including "sectarian" colleges, was deemed constitutional because the
funds were not to be used for "sectarian purposes."9 The distance of the
members of the Court from each other regarding the application of the
constitutional "test" of the establishment clause was most evident in Wolman v.
Walter.97 Seven opinions were written concerning Ohio's expenditure of funds
lending secular textbooks and instructional materials, providing standardized
testing and scoring services, and offering diagnostic and therapeutic services to
nonpublic school students. All but the lending of instructional materials was
found constitutional. Finally, in 1980, the Court upheld a New York law
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reimbursing nonpublic schools for the costs associated with the giving and
correcting of state-mandated examinations. 8
In Justice Brennan's view, making dichotomous cuts at the secondary/postsecondary or benefit-to-child/benefit-to-school levels simply did not adequately
apply the requirements of the establishment clause. Justice Brennan consistently
voted to strike down any program "aiding" sectarian institutions or nonpublic
schoolchildren. 99 In the mid-1970s, Justice Brennan's reasons for dissenting
were slightly altered. Until Meek, Justice Brennan relied on his opinion in
Schempp to conclude that any programs which "(a) serve the essentially religious
activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for
essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve
governmental ends, where secular means would suffice,"1' ° were unconstitutional. Even after the Court announced the Lemon test, Justice Brennan did not rely
on that "test" to ascertain the constitutionality of a statute alleged unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. However, in Meek and Wolman, the
programs were unconstitutional because they caused political division along
religious lines,1"' something the Constitution forbade, and which the Court had
implicitly "added [as] a ... fourth factor to the test" in Lemon.ln Justice
Brennan also announced in Meek that the decision in Board of Education v.
Allen, °3 which sustained a New York program through which the state lent
textbooks to all students in grades seven through twelve, and in which Justice
Brennan10 had
joined, was likely unconstitutional after the decisions in Lemon and
4
Nyquist.
The fear of political divisiveness along religious lines had influenced the
Court's understanding of the religion clauses since the Everson case. The
problem with the "political divisiveness" factor was that it either proved too little
or too much. It proved too little if the argument was related to the fear of the
framers, because, as Justice Powell noted in a widely quoted opinion in the
Wolman case:
[A]t this point in the 20th century we are quite far removed from the
dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Establishment
Clause in the Bill of Rights. The risk of significant religious or

98.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
99. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). In addition, Justice Brennan joined the dissent in Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 750 (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 295, and citing his opinions in
Walz and Lemon).
101. Meek, 421 U.S. at 374-75 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-23). See also Wolman, 433 U.S.
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denominational control over our democratic processes-or even of
deep political division along religious lines-is remote, and when
viewed against the positive contributions of sectarian schools, any
such risk seems entirely tolerable in light of the continuing oversight
of this CourLt s
Additionally, the parents, children, or schools which benefitted from these
programs were not a political majority, and there was little indication that the
political process itself frustrated any efforts to rescind passage of these bills.'0°
The political divisiveness argument also proved too much. The very act of
filing a lawsuit alleging the unconstitutionality of a state-funded program was
evidence of the political divisiveness of the program. More importantly, it called
into question the efforts of Justice Brennan to carve religiously-based exemptions
into general laws. That is, the decision in Sherbert was based on the notion that
the effect of the law forced persons to choose either to follow the tenets of their
faith or abandon those tenets to obtain monetary benefits. The free exercise
clause forbade the states from forcing the religious believer to make this choice.
However, allowing believers to make those choices indirectly forced others to
contribute to state coffers to pay for the compensation benefits of the religious
believer.
The nearly unanimous opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoderles in 1972 broadened the
application of the free exercise clause to include a constitutionally-based
exemption from state-mandated school attendance requirements. McDaniel v.
Paty,'68 a 1978 case, called into question the notion of political divisiveness in
the context of interpreting the free exercise clause. A Tennessee statutory
provision forbade "Ministers of the Gospel" from serving as delegates to the
state's constitutional convention' °9 McDaniel, a Baptist minister and candidate
to the convention, was sued by his opponent Paty, who alleged that McDaniel
was ineligible to serve as a delegate. A plurality of the Court, after first noting
that a number of states disqualified ministers from holding legislative office,110
concluded that this statute violated the free exercise clause not because it
infringed on McDaniel's freedom of belief, but because the state's reason for
making clergy ineligible, to prevent political divisiveness, was not compelling.

105. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 263 (Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
106. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Given the
Court's struggles with these aid programs, it did not appear as though the programs were
unconstitutional on their face, another approach suggested in Justice Stone's opinion.
107. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Justice Douglas dissented in part, on the grounds that the wishes of
two of the minor children concerning their desire to attend high school were not ascertained.
108. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
109. Id. at 620. A constitutional provision forbade ministers of the Gospel from serving as
Tennessee legislators.
110. IA at 622. The plurality also noted that Madison opposed this disqualification in
opposition to Jefferson. Id at 623-24.
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan made two incisive points. First, he
restated the plurality's opinion as "McDaniel could not be and was not in fact
barred for his belief in religion, but was barred because of his commitment to
persuade or lead others to accept that belief.""' In Justice Brennan's view, this
was an unacceptable (and sophistic) distinction. Second, he marked the contours
of the political divisiveness rationale. Avoiding political divisiveness along
religious lines was a goal of the establishment clause, but it was necessarily
tempered by an understanding of our "tradition of religious liberty." 1 This
tradition meant the state could not constitutionally suppress religious ideas,
thoughts, and actions in an attempt to avoid political divisiveness.
The last issue addressed by the Court in this area in the 1970s concerned state
involvement in church disputes. A 1976 opinion"1 written by Justice Brennan
eliminated earlier language which permitted courts to intervene in church
property disputes when it was claimed that the ecclesiastical decision was a result
of "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness."" 4 The Milivojevich case appeared to
further insulate religious organizations from state involvement in their property
disputes. The difficulty with insulating the religious organizations from state
court judgment, of course, is that the insulation creates a distortion which may
intrude on the very autonomy the insulation is supposed to protect. The final
church property dispute decided by the Court added to that distortion by
adopting a "neutral principles of law" approach to resolving a dispute involving
a local church which, in a majority decision, voted to withdraw from the
Presbyterian Church of the United States ("PCUS")."5 Neutral principles of
law permitted the state to adopt "a presumptive rule of majority representation,
defeasible upon a showing that the identity of the local church is to be
determined by some other means.... Majority rule is generally employed in the
governance of religious societies." 116 Consequently, unless a hierarchical church
organization (like the PCUS) had identified itself in secular terms as a
hierarchical church, the ownership of the local church property could be
determined based on the form of the congregational religious society.
The Court also held in 1979 that the National Labor Relations Board could
not exercise jurisdiction in monitoring the labor relations of two Catholic high
schools." 7 Avoiding the constitutional issue, the majority concluded that the

111. Id at 635 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
112. Id at 638.
113. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
114. Id at 712-13.
115. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). Justice Brennan voted with the majority in Jones, and
did not write an opinion.
116. Id at 607.
117. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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federal labor relations laws were not intended by Congress to apply to churchoperated schools."'
IV. REVOLVING, 1981-1990

Tinkering with the application of the establishment clause to a variety of
federal and state programs was a hallmark of the Court in the 1970s. The result
satisfied no one. Efforts in the 1980s were made first to scrap the approach
rigidified in Lemon and to begin anew; when this failed, further efforts were
made, beginning with Justice O'Connor, to alter the focus of the Lemon
approach. While Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" approach has been
incorporated into the Court's establishment clause thinking,1 9 the approach
may also have triggered the complete disintegration of any consensual mode of
interpretation of the establishment clause.
Contrary to the record of the Court concerning the establishment clause, the
Court in the 1970s was partly successful in making the free exercise clause a
meaningful part of the Constitution. The argument that follows is that the
efforts to halt a revolution regarding the interpretation of the establishment
clause eventually resulted in a revolution regarding the interpretation of the free
exercise clause.
In 1983, the Court heard a case involving the constitutionality of Nebraska's
practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer.'" Relying solely on the
history of the United States concerning legislative prayers, the Court held that
12
this practice, "deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country," 1
was constitutional. In dissent, Justice Brennan both adopted and revised his
views expressed in Schempp. He relied on Schempp for the proposition that
history simply was not enough to hold any particular practice constitutional in
the late 20th century. He revised his opinion in Schempp by concluding, contrary
to his conclusion in Schempp, that the specific practice of opening each
legislative day with a prayer violated the establishment clause under the Lemon
test.m Justice Brennan noted four purposes of the establishment clause: (1)
to remind the state of the individual right to conscience; (2) to preserve the
autonomy of religious life; (3) to prevent a trivialization of religion; and (4) to
assure essentially religious issues do not become part of politics.1 3 The

118. Id. at 507. In dissent, Justice Brennan wrote that the decision of the majority distorted the
language of the National Labor Relations Act, and concluded that the Act permitted the NLRB to
assert jurisdiction over lay teachers at parochial schools. Justice Brennan refused to examine whether
the NLRB could constitutionally assert such jurisdiction.
119. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (plurality opinion of Blackmun,
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perspective of these purposes is notably that of the religious believer, not the
perspective of the state or the non-believer. It is not neutral.
The week before the Marsh decision was issued, the Court found constitutional
a Minnesota program which allowed citizens to deduct from their taxes expenses
for tuition, books, and transportation incurred by their elementary and secondary
school children in Mueller v. Allen. 4 The deduction was available whether the
child attended a public or nonpublic school, but virtually all beneficiaries were
parents of nonpublic schoolchildren.'2
A year after Marsh and Mueller, the Court held that a display during the
Christmas season of a city-owned creche at a privately-owned park was
constitutional under the Lemon formulation. 6 Justice Brennan dissented,
arguing that there was no clear secular purpose for including the creche in the
Christmas display12
This shift in the establishment clause abruptly ended in 1985 with the
companion cases of Grand Rapids School District v. BallP and Aguilar v.
Felton.' Writing for the majority in both cases, Justice Brennan declared
unconstitutional programs funded by governmental bodies which assisted the
education of nonpublic schoolchildren. In Ball, the two programs struck down
were known as the Shared Time and Community Education programs. The
Shared Time program offered classes at the nonpublic schools during the regular
schoolday taught by public school teachers which supplemented the curriculum
at nonpublic schools. The Community Education program was an after-school
program taught in the nonpublic schools but open to all students. Most of the
Community Education teachers were employed full-time as teachers by nonpublic
schools. Both programs were determined to have the primary effect of advancing
religion in three possible ways: first, the teachers might intentionally or
inadvertently inculcate particular religious beliefs; second, the programs might
provide a symbolic link between government and religion; and third, the
programs provided a subsidy to the schools involved in the programs.'"
In Aguilar, the City of New York used federal funds to pay the salaries of
public school teachers who volunteered for assignment to local parochial schools
to assist educationally deprived parochial school students from low income
backgrounds. The teachers who provided the services under this "Title I"
program were monitored by the City to ensure that they did not communicate
any religious messages while teaching. Justice Brennan concluded that the
124. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
125.

Tuition expenses for summer public school and for attending a school outside the student's
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monitoring system violated the entanglement provision of the Lemon test. 31
Thus, the Shared Time program in Ball violated the "primary effect" requirement of Lemon because the government did not monitor the teachers to ensure
they did not inculcate certain religious beliefs; and the Title I program in New
York City violated the "entanglement" requirement of Lemon because the City
did monitor the teachers to ensure that no religious message was communicated.
Proof that the public school teachers in the Shared Time program might inject
religion into the classroom consisted of a notation that approximately 10% of
the Shared Time teachers had previously been employed in religious schools, a
percentage Justice Brennan deemed "significant."'2 There was no evidence of
any attempt to indoctrinate students, but since the parents of the sectarian
schoolchildren would have no reason to complain, and since the state would have
no knowledge of such incidents because they were not monitoring the program,
this lack of evidence was unavailingY3
The effect of these decisions on the part of the government was either to end
these admittedly beneficial programs or to accept the suggestion of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals and the dissent in the Supreme Court to continue the
programs off the premises of the religious school, m thus cynically (and
formalistically) evading the decisions. The effect on parents was to force them
to choose either to forego the program benefits and continue to send their
children to religious schools, or remove their children from the religious schools
to obtain the benefits at the public schools.
Once government was acknowledged as more than a passive arbiter within the
economy or society, the retreat to "neutrality" was impossible. The activities
government engaged in eliminated any space for neutrality, because governmental action had an impact on persons within the society. The decision of Justice
Brennan in Ball and Aguilar not to acknowledge that these cases would force
some parents to make cruel choices between the material welfare of their
children and the spiritual welfare of their children paralleled Justice Rutledge's
arguments in Everson."' While establishment clause jurisprudence disparaged
the notion of rational line-drawing among forms of aid, the free exercise clause
was much more formally interpreted in light of "neutrality." When government
was acknowledged as a more pervasive actor in society, the interpretive choices
of the religion clauses become either hostility (or disregard) or advancement (or
support). Since the programs in Ball andAguilarwere perceived by the majority
as advancing religion and entangling government and religion, they were
unconstitutional.

131. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 412-13.
132. Bal, 473 U.S. at 387 & n.7.
133. Id. at 388-89. One problem with this analysis is that there was little evidence that the
teachers in either the Shared Time or Title I programs were usually members of the same faith as
those they were teaching.
134. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 430-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

135. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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Ball and Aguilar effectively halted the attempt to revolutionize the interpretation of the establishment clause.'m Ball andAguilarwere buttressed by another
decision written by Justice Brennan, Edwards v. Aguillard. 7 The Court held
that a Louisiana statute requiring "balanced treatment" between evolution and
creation science was unconstitutional. The law was unconstitutional because it
lacked a secular purpose, since the "preeminent purpose of the Louisiana
Legislature was clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural
being created humankind." 138
Justice Scalia's dissent focused on the difficulty of reconciling the two religion
clauses. Since the free exercise clause occasionally required the "intentional
governmental advancement of religion,"" 9 and since the Court had permitted
government to accommodate religion even when not so required by the free
exercise clause,'4 it was difficult (if not impossible) to reconcile these cases
with the requirement in Lemon that governmental action not have the primary
effect of advancing religion. The dissent pointed out what Justice Brennan's
opinion had so assiduously avoided: teaching evolution in public schools affected
the free exercise rights of children who, for religious reasons, did not believe in
evolution. 4'
Justice Brennan argued in Schempp that the public schools were a neutral,
nonreligious site where American values were inculcated. The Edwards case
brought into relief the argument that the "American values" taught in the public
schools could themselves be perceived as anti-religious. Edwards again provided
a picture in which the space for neutrality (the public schools) was occupied by
an ideology which offended some believers. The Court could only avoid the
problem by retaining a formal view of the free exercise clause.
Through 1987, the Court, with some important exceptions, continued to extend
the range of free exercise protections. Sherbert was twice extended to apply to
claims for unemployment benefits made by religious believers; 42 religious
speech was granted protection equivalent to other forms of speech in public

136. Another case decided a month earlier held unconstitutional a "moment of silence" statute.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). However, Justice O'Connor signaled that her concurrence in
the Court's decision was based on the context of the Alabama statute at issue, and that other moment
of silence laws were likely constitutional. Id at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist wrote dissents urging the Court to abandon the Lemon test. Id
at 89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 108-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's dissent
urged a new historical understanding of the establishment clause.
137. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
138. Id at 591.
139. Id at 617.
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142. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Secur. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (A
Jehovah's Witness who "voluntarily" left his job at a munitions factory was entitled to unemployment
benefits); Hobbiev. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (an individual who became
a Seventh-Day Adventist after being employed, and then was fired for refusing to work on Saturdays,
her Sabbath, was constitutionally entitled to unemployment compensation).
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forums; 43 regulations aimed at certain religious organizations were found
unconstitutional; 144 the Court found constitutional a provision of the Civil
Rights Act granting religious organizations an exemption from the Act's
prohibition against religious discrimination in employment; 145 and an equally
divided Court affirmed a court of appeals decision granting a religious believer
an exemption from a Nebraska requirement that an individual's photograph be
taken and placed on a driver's license.146
In several other cases, however, the Court refused to extend the protection of
the free exercise clause. In United States v. Lee, 147 the Court, including Justice
Brennan, refused to grant an Amish employer an exemption from paying Social
Security taxes. The Court also held that a governmental decision to assign, for
its administrative purposes, a Social Security number to Little Bird of the Snow
Roy did not violate the free exercise rights of Little Bird of the Snow or her
parents."48 The Roy family claimed that, given their religious beliefs, the
government's decision to assign a Social Security number to Little Bird of the
Snow would rob her spirit. The Court refused to find a constitutional violation
under those circumstances. In another case, the Court found a Connecticut
statute providing a religious believer a right not to work on his Sabbath violated
the establishment clause.'49 Two other cases, Goldman v. Weinberger" and
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,15' elicited dissents from Justice Brennan. In both
cases the majority held that the Court should defer to the decisions of the
military and prison officials, respectively, regarding free exercise claims. Justice
Brennan's opinions urged the Court to engage in a meaningful review, not to
abdicate review by "deferring" to governmental authorities.
While this background indicates that free exercise claims were not always
vindicated, the claims were not routinely dismissed. The first major shift in
interpreting free exercise claims occurred one year after the decision in Edwards,
in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAssociation. 2
In order to complete a road between the California towns of Gasquet and
Orleans, the United States Forest Service planned to build a six-mile stretch of
road through the Chimney Rock section of the Six Rivers National Forest. An

143. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
144. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
145. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (holding Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 constitutional).
Justice Brennan concurred on the grounds that the categorical exemption from the prohibition against
religious discrimination was constitutional as applied to a nonprofit organization. Id at 340.
146. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985).
147. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
148. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). The Court remanded the issue whether the
government could require the Roys to furnish the social security number of Little Bird of the Snow
in order to obtain monetary benefits if that action by the Roys violated their religious beliefs.
149. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
150. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
151. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
152. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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environmental impact statement determined that the Chimney Rock area was an
integral and indispensable part of Native American religion, and recommended
that the road not be completed for that reason. The Forest Service rejected the
recommendation, and a lawsuit was filed by the Association. Relying on Roy,
Justice O'Connor concluded that the free exercise rights of Native Americans
were not violated because they would not be "coerced by the Government's
action into violating their religious beliefs... .3 If "coercion" was viewed in
formal terms, the decision in Lyng was easily defensible since the government
was not engaged in "legal discrimination," and it neither prohibited the religious
worship of the Native American claimants nor required them to worship.
Justice Brennan's dissent relied on his view of free exercise from his decision
in Braunfeld. It was the effect of the governmental action that triggered first
amendment analysis, not the form of the action. s4 Since the believers had
shown that the government's proposed action would effectively prevent them
from practicing their religion, the free exercise clause had been violated.15s In
Lyng, unlike Ball Aguilar,or Edwards, Justice Brennan downplayed the impact
on the taxpayer compared with the impact on the believer.
Returning to the establishment clause the next year, the Court found itself
without a majority opinion in two important cases. In Texas Monthly v.
Bullock,15 6 Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality, found a Texas statute
exempting religious periodicals from its sales tax violated the establishment
clause. In County of Allegheny v. ACL U, 7 a creche displayed at the Allegheny
County courthouse during the Christmas season violated the establishment
clause, but a display of a menorah, a Christmas tree, and a sign saluting religious
liberty at the entrance to the City-County building a block and a half away did
not.
The plurality opinion in Texas Monthly changed the interpretation of the
religion clauses in four ways. First, the plurality stated that the establishment
clause prohibited "legislation that constitutes an endorsement of one or another
set of religious beliefs or of religion generally,"158 thus adapting Justice
O'Connor's "endorsement" approach to establishment clause problems. Second,
cases in which religion benefitted from governmental (and Court) action were
re-read to be constitutional only if the benefits "flowed to a large number of
nonreligious groups as well."59 Third, and corollary to the second proposition,
governmental aid to religious groups was unconstitutional unless required by the
free exercise clause.16' Fourth, the holdings in the Murdock 6 and Follett6'
153.
154.
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cases, which granted exemptions to Jehovah's Witnesses from licensing and
occupational taxes, and which Justice Brennan had relied upon in his first
religion clause opinion, the dissent in Braunfeld, would be limited to their facts,
and any language which implied that the government could not tax the sale of
religious publications was rejected. 163 Unless government was simply including
religion among other nonreligious groups, existing societal differences in religion
could not constitutionally be accommodated. This broadening of the level of
generality eliminated any space for permissible governmental acknowledgment
of religion in American public life. Government was not permitted to grant
religion or religious believers any benefit unless it was compelled to do so by the
free exercise clause. In other words, unless a governmental benefit to religion
or religious believers was compelled by the free exercise clause, it was forbidden
by the establishment clause.
The concurrence by Justice Blackmun in Texas Monthly suggested that the
opinion by Justice Brennan resolved "the tension between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause values simply by subordinating the Free Exercise value,
even it seems to me, at the expense of longstanding precedents."'6 The dissent
of Justice Scalia, conversely, subordinated the establishment clause to the free
exercise clause, according to Justice Blackmun. Justice Blackmun suggested his
opinion offered a middle ground between the two polar extremes represented by
the plurality and dissenting opinions.165
Later that term Justice Blackmun again found himself in the middle of an
establishment clause dispute. The County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, permitted
a private, religious organization to place a creche on the grand staircase of the
county courthouse. Additionally, an 18-foot menorah, a 45-foot Christmas tree
and a sign entitled "Salute to Liberty"166 were placed at an entrance to the CityCounty building, jointly owned by the City of Pittsburgh and the County of
Allegheny, during the Christmas season. Justice Blackmun, now writing the
plurality opinion, held the former display unconstitutional and the latter
constitutional. 67 The display of the menorah, tree, and sign was constitutional,
Justice Blackmun concluded, because the display was a secular display regarding
the "winter-holiday season."16 Justice O'Connor wrote separately on this point,
concluding that the "salute to liberty" display was constitutional because,
although the menorah was a religious symbol, the Christmas tree was not, and

162.

321 U.S. 573 (1944).

163. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 21-25.
164. Id at 27 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
165. Id at 28.
166. The sign stated, "During this holiday season, the City of Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let
these festive lights remind us that we are the keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of
freedom." County of Allegheny, 109 S.Ct. at 3095.
167. Id at 3095.
168. Id at 3113.

JUSTICE BRENNAN AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES

therefore the government "conveyed a message of pluralism and freedom of
belief during the holiday season."'o
Justice Brennan, as one of the dissenters in Lynch, concurred in the decision
holding the display of the creche unconstitutional. He challenged Justice
Blackmun's conclusion that the "salute to liberty" display was secular on the
grounds "that the sight of an 18-foot menorah would be far more eye-catching
than that of a rather conventionally sized Christmas tree."17° The result, then,
would be that menorah would dominate the Christmas tree, and a message
endorsing religion would be conveyed.' 7' He challenged Justice O'Connor's
conclusion by arguing that the "pluralism" the government was talking about was
religious pluralism. 72 Therefore, the Christmas tree was a religious symbol, and
government was unconstitutionally endorsing religion.
In Walz, Justice Brennan had used words similar to those of Justice O'Connor
in finding constitutional New York City's property tax exemption for charitable
(including religious) organizations. He stated, "government grants exemptions
to religious organizations because they uniquely contribute to the pluralism of
American society by their religious activities."' 73 The "pluralism" to which
Justice Brennan referred in Walz as valuable in American society is religious
pluralism. By challenging Justice O'Connor's "pluralism" argument, Justice
Brennan was challenging his own argument made twenty years earlier. In County
ofAllegheny, Justice Brennan concluded, the pluralism celebrated was a deformed
pluralism, distorted to support government's own cause and shaped in ways
which he considered offensive to many devoutly religious. 74 This was Justice
Brennan's last religion clause opinion.
As in Texas Monthly, there was a strong dissent in County ofAllegheny, on this
occasion written by Justice Kennedy. The dissent again suggested a re-framing
of the establishment clause based on the perception that the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause manifested hostility to religion.175
During Justice Brennan's last term, the Court, with Justice Scalia writing for
the majority, held that an Oregon statute criminalizing the possession of peyote
did not infringe the free exercise beliefs of Native Americans who used peyote
for sacramental purposes during religious ceremonies. Consequently, the state
could deny unemployment benefits to those fired for using peyote for religious
purposes. 7 6 "We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the

169. I1 at 3123 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in the judgment).
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State is free to regulate."177 The Smith majority limited the Sherbert case to the
position as an oddity in the field of unemployment compensation law. 78 Thus
an approach evaluating the effect of the governmental action on religious
practice was discarded. The Court also unanimously decided in 1990 to limit the
holding of Murdock and Follett to their facts, 179 allowing greater governmental
regulation (by taxation) of religiously-based actions involving the sale of
religious materials, thereby eliminating another underpinning of Justice
Brennan's dissent in Braunfeld
CONCLUSION
It is clear that Justice Brennan will be remembered as one of the great Justices
of the Supreme Court of the United States. His empathy, devotion to principle,
unfailing patience with the uncertain process of creating jurisprudence, and
enormous ability mark his tenure. Those same traits will mark the vast areas of
law affected by his opinions, including the religion clauses. This Article has no
conclusion. It was premised on the belief that Justice Brennan's religion clause
opinions were filled with good intentions for individual religious believers,
religious organizations, and American society. The early opinions written by
Justice Brennan promoted individual belief both by creating a distance between
government and religion, as in Schempp, and by making us aware of the "tilt" in
laws which required a re-balancing by the Court, as in Braunfeld and Sherbert.
The problem was that the tilt appeared in a myriad of situations, and the only
situation in which redressing tilt was recognized was in cases analogizing
Sherbert. This was always the myth of neutrality, as Justice Brennan seemed to
recognize, but the language of neutrality became the interpretive mode for the
Court in the dizzying variety of establishment clause cases. "Neutral" space
between the two religion clauses was carved away by an increasing number of
decisions until Texas Monthly suggested to a majority that they had to jump to
one clause or the other. The revolution which created Court-based protection
for religious belief from legislative interference appears destined to revolve into
a situation in which religious belief is protected only through limited forrs of
legislative grace.
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